BACKGROUND TO THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE OF I907

363
Hardinge and Napier, the military attache in Russia, by this date were agreed that the danger of the war being extended to the North-West Frontier was over,19 but the home government was sufficiently alive to the danger, especially at a time when the Dogger Bank incident and other disputes concerning British shipping had exasperated Anglo-Russian relations to a dangerous level, to take precautions. Despite Japanese reluctance the English delayed the negotiations for a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty until the Japanese agreed to extend its scope to cover not only India but the adjacent regions as well.20 Balfour defined these as, 'Afghanistan, the strip of Persian territory adjoining Afghanistan and Baluchistan, or if the last be too large, then Seistan alone, and possibly Tibet . 21 What was it that the British feared? Few with any real knowledge of the situation were actually expecting a Russian attempt to invade India. Cecil Spring Rice believed in it and saw German machinations behind it,22 but Spring Rice was generally regarded as an alarmist. Arthur Nicolson, writing in I9I7, thought that the Russians had never seriously contemplated such a step.23 Grey was frankly sceptical of Russian ability or manpower in I906 to attempt such an invasion when they confessed their inability to drive back the Turkish troops from the Persian frontier.24 Most diplomatists now realized that the. Russians had for many years found the threat of a move towards the Indian frontier, and the resulting panic which this never failed to produce in London, a convenient means of putting pressure on the British to obtain concessions elsewhere.
Kitchener himself did not foresee a Russian invasion of India in the near future. But he pointed out in the memorandum referred to above that for the first time the extension of the Russian railway system brought the project within the bounds of practicality. By the end of the Russo-Japanese war the Russian position with regard to a possible advance towards India was extremely favourable. Two railway systems now gave the Russians possible lines of advance-which the British named the Kandahar and Kabul approaches. The first started at the Caspian ports and continued, via the Central Asian Railway, to Merv and so to the Russian fortified railhead at Kushk, only 483 miles from Kandahar. The second line followed the railway from Orenburg to Charjui on the Oxus, via Tashkent As far as Indian defence was concerned, however, the threat via Seistan was a subsidiary one to the danger presented now by the two possible lines of Russian advance through Afghanistan, and it was with Afghanistan that both the Indian government and the War Office were chiefly concerned. Relations between Afghanistan and Great Britain were peculiar. The external relations of Afghanistan had been under English control for the last twenty-five years and Great Britain was pledged by treaty to maintain the integrity of the Amir's dominions. The Amir received through India money, armaments and advice. Yet the actual situation belied this apparently close, protectorprotected relationship. No British or Indian agent was allowed to reside in Kabul, and Simla depended on an unreliable Afghan agent who was little better than a prisoner. The English complained that they had no way of receiving reliable information about the country they were pledged to defend. The Amir refused to allow them to construct the roads, railways and telegraphs which the British thought necessary for his defence, and he was not averse to playing the Russians and the British off against each other and intriguing with the rebellious tribes inside the Indian border. If troops were ever needed to defend Afghanistan 'no man can be sure that the armies despatched for that purpose would not have to fight their way through 25 
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Afghan troops and tribesmen to the positions they would be required to take Up .31 In this situation to defend Afghanistan against a Russian attack would not be easy and it was by no means certain that the Afghans would co-operate with the British or even remain neutral. The Indian defensive front was, and had been for some time, the Kabul-Kandahar alignment whose defence was felt to be essential to the protection of the North-West Frontier itself.
'There can be no doubt whatever', Kitchener's memorandum continues, 'regarding the ultimate aims of Russia. The Russian peace strength in Turkestan was sixty thousand men; their war strength was calculated to be one hundred thousand men. Although no appreciable additions of troops in the area had taken place recently, even during the Russo-Japanese war, reinforcements to the area would be easy to arrange. The British General Staff regarded the numbers of men that the Russians could pour into Central Asia at will as 'practically unlimited '.3 Both Kitchener and the War Office authorities reckoned that Herat could be captured and besieged within a week and that all northern Afghanistan, as far south as the Kabul-Kandahar alignment, could be overrun with more or less speed depending on the attitude of the Amir; one hundred and fifty thousand Russians reaching Kabul within a year. The Russians would then be in a position to occupy Afghan Turkestan indefinitely, without the British, whose military plans did not include forward action byond the Kabul-Kandahar alignment, being able to prevent it. A border incident would be easy to arrange and the Russians could also put themselves in the right by blaming the Amir and appealing to London, who claimed to control Afghan foreign policy, for redress. If the Amir refused to admit himself in the wrong, as was likely, If the Amir, as was by no means impossible, proved friendly to the invader, the Russians could not only rely on Afghan assistance or neutrality, but possibly also on the Amir's influence over the border tribes to ferment rebellion in India itself. One reason for the expedition to Tibet in I903 was the fear that Russian influence, once established in Lhasa, could be extended to Nepal and Sikkim.37
It was, then, with some justification that Kitchener argued that, in guaranteeing the integrity of Afghanistan, 'we have promised more than we are able to perform. Guarantees and pledges given diplomatically must to be effective be founded on military means to make them good ... We are in the position of a firm which has written cheques against a non-existent balance. '38 Kitchener believed that at least five years active preparation would be needed before India was ready to meet what he saw as the inevitable Russian threat to the integrity of Afghanistan. He believed that if measures were taken immediately this would be sufficient. After the Russo-Japanese war Clarke put the danger at ten years away ;39 Esher at six or seven.40 But that the danger was none the less real for being a long-term one even Nicolson, the least likely to be swept away by the Russian bogey, agreed.41
Kitchener's policy of preparation was to make it known that any Russian encroachment on Afghanistan, even an incident on the Pendjeh scale, would be met by a declaration of war. He advocated a firm military alliance with the Amir-a policy supported by the viceroy, Lord Minto, who repeatedly opposed the Anglo-Russian agreement on the grounds that it would alienate the Amir, who, from the point of view of India, was a more valuable friend and a more dangerous enemy than the Tsar.42 Kitchener also advocated a forward policy against the tribes on the frontier, including permanent occupation of the territories bordering on the Afghan frontier, and, most controversial of all, he proposed extending the Indian railway system towards Afghanistan by two lines. The reply of the government of India, incorporated in a memorandum by Beauchamp Duff (Kitchener's second in command) and dated 9 June I906, upheld Kitchener's view uncompromisingly. Admitting that recent events had lessened the probability of an early war, it nevertheless claimed 'that her [Russia's] potential power of offence as against India has not been reduced'. Her communication system in Central Asia was sufficient to enable Russia to put enough men in the field for her purpose. As for the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Anglo-French Entente, it was argued that it would be 'inexpedient and inadmissable' actually to introduce Japanese troops into India, while the French, however much they might give in the way of diplomatic aid to prevent a clash, once a war started were bound to assist their Russian ally, who could also count on German sympathy. The War Office, it was pointed out, also had little faith in the practicality of direct Japanese aid. Any reduction of the 70,000 men in India was regarded by Duff as out of the question. Their primary task was to counterbalance over 400,000 armed Indians and the ratio of Europeans to Indians generally was I 3,800.53
By the time Duff's memorandum was received in London, however, Nicolson was in St Petersburg and negotiations had started with regard to Tibet. The Liberal government had decided on other means of checking Russia. Sir George Clarke in October I905 had submitted to the Foreign Office a detailed draft agreement including in its scope the Dardanelles as well as Central Asia, and he had included in his supporting arguments the fact that it would replace the expensive necessity of constructing railways to the frontiers of Afghanistan. Charles Hardinge had merely minuted that 'happily there was no immediate necessity to discuss it' as negotiations with Russia were then out of the question.54
In July I906 Clarke returned to the subject in an attempt to help Morley sell the idea of this alternative to Simla. In a memorandum entitled Anglo- But there were other factors besides mere finance. Grey, in another context three years later, was to excuse expenditure on the grounds that promises of economy 'must be subordinate to national safety '.60 These months coincided with a general reconsideration of strategic thinking among those responsible for the defence of Great Britain and the Empire. Admiral Fisher, who lamented the prevalence of 'the bogey of the North West Frontier' among CampbellBannerman's Cabinet early in i906,61 had other bogeys in mind. In I905 the Committee of Imperial Defence discussed whether or not a foreign invasion of the British Isles was possible.62 It came to a negative conclusion but the alarm was such that the discussion, and the conclusion, was repeated in I907.63 In both cases the main enemy was seen not as Russia but as Germany. Lords Selbourne and Fisher, representing naval opinion, had regarded the Germans as a potential naval enemy as early as I902; the Anglo-Japanese alliance of that year was justified by the argument that it would enable part of the fleet to be withdrawn to home waters. 64 In I904 Fisher drew up a plan to redistribute the fleet to ensure a concentration in the Channel as a precaution against German ambitions. The Foreign Office objected to the scheme, but not because they disagreed about the German threat. 'It is generally recognised', wrote Hardinge in October I906, 'that Germany is the one disturbing factor owing to her ambitious schemes for a "weltpolitik" and for a naval as well as a military supremacy in Europe.'65 A month previously Esher had written of a future 'titanic struggle between Germany and England for mastery'. 66 If the navy was now looking to Germany as its opponent, the army, which in 1903 had seen Russia as its chief enemy, was also turning its attention nearer home. Mr Mackintosh, in a recent article on the Committee of Imperial Defence,6" has written that after 1904 the War Office turned its attention to Europe and co-operation with France, and was not organized for the active defence of India.
With the growth of the slowly realized German menace, Britain was forced to consider that she was no longer capable of meeting all her commitments. In December i906, five months after a war with Turkey over the Egyptian frontier had been seriously regarded as possible by the Cabinet, the General Staff reported that an attack on Gallipoli with a view to seizing the straits would be 'too difficult under modern conditions' and that passage of the straits could not be guaranteed without an alliance with Turkey. Two months later the Admiralty concurred and the government was forced to face the fact that, if Russia had tried to force the Strait during the Russo-Japanese war, Britain alone could not have prevented her. Grey urged the necessity of keeping this information strictly secret.68
Another deficiency, and one which affected India, was the size of the army which Haldane was intending to reduce. Not only was the army now geared to Europe, but its size was inadequate for the protection of India in time of war. In the autumn of I906 If, then, it is, given our existing military strength, impossible for us to advance beyond the Kabul-Kandahar alignment towards Herat, either the policy of maintaining the integrity of Afghanistan should be abandoned as impractical or our resources and preparations should be such as will, in the event of Russia invading Afghanistan, enable us to meet any of the contingeilcies which may arise.
That is, including a forward advance to expel the Russians from the northern half of the country.
The survey, obviously sceptical of a successful outcome of Nicolson's negotiations, pointed out that, even if Russia's protestations that she had no designs on India were true, the Russians had never denied that they intended to absorb Afghanistan and make the Russo-British frontiers conterminous. 'When that has been effected,' the survey concluded ominously, 'the military burdens of India and the Empire will be so enormously increased that, short of a recasting of our whole military system, it will become a question of practical politics whether or not it is worth our while to retain India or not.'72 This astonishing conclusion, which surpassed in pessimism anything that Kitchener had written, may possibly, together with the difficult phase through which the negotiations were passing, explain the re-opening of the question in January 
